











A dispersão entre bancos das taxas de empréstimo tem sido bastante elevada no Brasil. 
Vários possíveis fatores podem explicar esta característica, incluindo, entre outros, 
custos de busca e de mudança significativos, baixa concorrência e heterogeneidade entre 
os bancos. O propósito do presente trabalho é avaliar o papel dos custos de busca na 
explicação dos níveis de dispersão observados. Uma medida adotada pelo Banco 
Central em outubro de 1999 disponibilizando em sua homepage as taxas de empréstimo 
praticadas por cada instituição financeira é utilizada como um experimento natural. Os 
resultados indicam que os custos de busca explicam parcela significativa da dispersão 







The dispersion of loan interest rates across banks has been remarkably high in Brazil. 
Many factors can account for such feature including, among others, significant search 
and switching costs, lack of competition, and bank heterogeneity. The aim of the paper 
is to evaluate the role of search costs in explaining the size of the loan interest rate 
dispersion found in data. A policy change undertook in October 1999, by which the 
Central Bank started to make the bank lending rates available in its homepage, is used 
as a natural experiment. The results show that search costs can account for a significant 
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In October 1999, the Brazilian Central Bank launched a set of policies and actions with the 
declared purpose of reducing the high bank interest spread found in the industry. One of the 
first actions undertook by the Central Bank was to start publishing at its website homepage 
the average lending rates charged by each commercial bank for each loan category. Currently, 
in addition to the average rate, the Central Bank also makes available the minimum and the 
maximum rates charged by each bank. The aim of this action was to increase bank 
competition, which would make them reduce their loan rates as well as the interest spread. It 
is interesting to add that the Central Bank had no declared intention to affect the interest rate 
dispersion across banks with this policy action, and we use this information as a way to 
identify the role of search costs in price dispersion. 
 
Significant price dispersion across producers in a market can be found due to several reasons, 
such as [see Roberts and Supina (1997)]: a) existence of search costs; b) existence of 
consumer switching costs; c) product differentiation, i.e. the products are not perfectly 
homogeneous because producers offer different services, have different locations, have 
different costs, etc; d) macroeconomic factors like the inflation rate, which can affect the 
behavior of price dispersion across time; e) market power and lack of competition, which 
makes possible for some producers to systematically charge higher prices than their rivals. 
 
Since the seminal paper by Stigler (1961), economists have accepted the idea that price 
dispersion can be found as an equilibrium outcome in information-based models even in 
competitive homogeneous goods markets. Imperfect information by customers and search 
costs may generate equilibrium price dispersion even in such markets [Salop and Stiglitz 
(1982)]. 
 
The empirical literature on price dispersion has tried to devise clever identification strategies 
to single out the contribution of the different factors. The difficulty lies in pinpointing the 
contribution of search costs as opposed to the alternative explanation that price dispersion is 
due to product differences (e.g. in quality, in costs, etc) that are not observed by the 
econometrician. Dahlby and West (1986) study prices for auto insurance policies and find that 
premiums are less dispersed among those driver classes for which search is more likely to 
occur. Using a similar identification strategy, Sorensen (2000) analyzes the market for 
prescription drugs and found that price dispersion is lower for prescriptions that must be 
purchased frequently. Kessner and Polborn (2000) uses a tax change to identify the relevance 
of search costs in explaining dispersion in the German life insurance market. The 
identification strategy pursued in this paper is similar to Kessner and Polborn (2000) in the 
sense that we also make use of a policy change to measure the relevance of search costs. 
 
The first purpose of this paper is to document the behavior of loan rate dispersion across 
banks for different loan categories. Section 2 describes the data and presents some indicators 
trying to follow both the temporal evolution of loan rate dispersion as well as the 
heterogeneous patterns across different loan categories. Section 3 tries to quantify the role 
played by search costs to account for the rate dispersion found in the data. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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2) Descriptive analysis for the loan rate dispersion for Brazilian banks 
 
 
The primary source of data was the daily average loan rates reported by each financial 
institution for each loan category to the Central Bank. The reported values are gross rates 
(rates paid by the borrower) by including financial taxation plus commissions and fees. We 
report results for the monthly rates, which were calculated through the capitalization of the 
daily rates standardized for a 21-working day month, according to the application of the 
following expression: 
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where: n corresponds to the number of working days in a particular month; 
id is the average daily loan rate reported by a particular bank for loan category k; 
ik,M is the monthly loan rate charged by a particular bank for loan category k. 
 
Some outliers were also excluded from the analysis. All rates above the 99% quantile were 
eliminated. This procedure resulted in the exclusion of 11 observations from a total of 53,527 
values. We examined nine fixed-rate loan categories, namely overnight lending, receivables 
discount, discount of promissory notes, working capital finance, overdraft line of credit, 
finance of acquisition of goods, and vendor for the corporate sector as well as personal 
overdraft, and personal loans for the household sector. We excluded from the analysis all the 
floating-rate loan categories as well as the fixed-rate loan categories related to goods 
acquisition finance for households, real estate finance and other not-specified categories. The 
main reason for the exclusion of such categories was the non-availability of any information 
for them previous to October 1999, which would preclude us to evaluate the role played by 
the availability of bank-level lending rates in the Central Bank homepage as a mechanism to 
reduce interest rate dispersion.
1 
 
The Brazilian Central Bank started to collect daily data on loan interest rates in October 1996. 
However, due to the small number of surveyed institutions at the beginning of the period, as 
one can see from the observation of Figure 1, our analysis is restricted to the period beginning 
in March 1997 and ending in July 2002, totaling 65 monthly observations in the time series 
dimension. The number of surveyed banks differs across loan categories because not all banks 
grant loans in all categories. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For the excluded loan categories, the starting collection date was May 2000.   4

















































Discount of Promissory Notes
Working Capital
Overdraft Line of Credit






A first measure of loan rate dispersion across banks that we calculated was the monthly 
interquartile distance, which corresponds to the difference between the third and the first 
distribution quartiles. Figures 2 to 4 report the interquartile distance for each loan category. 
 
The first noteworthy observation is the high value found for the loan rate dispersions. For 
some corporate loan categories, the interquartile distance reached values in excess of 3.5% per 
month (or 51.1% per year). That is, in a same month, one could find banks operating in the 
market whose lending rates differ by factors superior to 3.5% per month. The interquartile 
distance is even greater for household loan categories (Figure 4). For such categories, the 
difference in the loan rates between banks located in the third and first quartiles reached 
values as high as 5.0% per month (79.6% per month). 
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The second point we want to stress from the observation of Figures 2 to 4 is the temporal 
evolution of the dispersion measures. One can verify that, as a general pattern, the dispersion 
of all loan categories show high volatilities at the beginning of the sample period (from March 
1997 to April 1999). After May 1999, there is an overall decreasing trend. Such behavior is 
particularly more pronounced in the period from November 1999 to July 2000. One possible 
reason for this fall in the loan dispersions may be related to the reduction of search costs 
promoted with the Central Bank initiative to start reporting the loan rates in its homepage.
2 
Finally, towards the end of the sample period (after September 2001), loan dispersions started 
to increase again, probably due to uncertainties related to the worsening of overall economic 
conditions in the country. 
 
The third and last comment about Figures 2 to 4 is related to the great heterogeneity across 
loan categories. Overdraft credit for both corporate and household sectors show the largest 
rate dispersions. Such loan categories are very short-term in nature and they are both linked to 
the keeping of a demand deposit account by the borrower, which greatly increases switching 
costs for them. On the other extreme are the rate dispersions related to vendor and to 
receivables discount. One possible reason for the lower rate dispersion for them is that these 
operations are backed by securities owned by the borrower and offered as collateral, which 
works towards reducing the borrowing costs of such loans as well as the rate dispersion. 
 
It is possible that the loan rate dispersion follows the behavior of the loan rate level. In other 
words, it is possible that high dispersion is found during periods where the level of the 
average lending rates is also high. Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between 
dispersion and central location measures for each loan category The results suggest that, with 
the exception of receivables discount, the correlations found in the data are in fact very high.  
                                                 
2 Section 3 aims at investigating this claim more carefully.   7

















Overnight Lending  74%  76%  54% 
Receivables Discount  37%  38%  5% 
Discount of Promissory Notes  57%  60%  71% 
Working Capital   51%  56%  43% 
Overdraft Line of Credit - Corporate 57%  74%  67% 
Goods Acquisition - Corporate  79%  84%  69% 
Vendor 79%  82%  75% 
Personal Overdraft  80%  80%  92% 
Personal Loans  86%  73%  55% 
 
We therefore adjusted the dispersion measures controlling for the behavior of the average 
rates. Table 2 shows the results. This table reports the annual means for two measures of 
dispersion, namely the coefficient of variation and the ratio of the interquartile distance to the 
median. 
 
Table 2: Measures of dispersion – Annual means 
Loan Categories  Measure  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.45 0.44  0.55 0.47 0.38  0.39 
Overnight Lending  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.51 0.51  0.61 0.46 0.46  0.44 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.24 0.23  0.28 0.29 0.30  0.30 
Receivables Discount  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.37 0.30  0.42 0.34 0.32  0.31 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.36 0.24  0.34 0.30 0.25  0.26 
Discount of Promissory 
Notes  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.44 0.33  0.49 0.38 0.27  0.29 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.56 0.40  0.44 0.43 0.36  0.35 
Working Capital  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.49 0.43  0.57 0.49 0.49  0.43 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.54 0.47  0.54 0.47 0.43  0.44 
Overdraft Line of Credit - 
Corporate  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.73 0.67  0.67 0.54 0.47  0.51 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.38 0.39  0.52 0.38 0.32  0.32 
Goods Acquisition - 
Corporate  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.54 0.46  0.50 0.43 0.36  0.32   8
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.39 0.33  0.38 0.33 0.25  0.24 
Vendor  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.50 0.43  0.46 0.34 0.29  0.31 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.33 0.34  0.36 0.32 0.34  0.35 
Personal Overdraft  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.36 0.41  0.48 0.38 0.38  0.37 
Coefficient of 
Variation  0.50 0.49  0.52 0.55 0.54  0.54 
Personal Loans  Interquartile 
Distance/ 
Median 
0.60 0.61  0.62 0.53 0.56  0.57 
OBS.: For 1997, mean is from March to December; for 2002, mean is from January to July. 
 
 
One can observe that, with the exception of the coefficient of variation for receivables 
discount and for personal loans, there is a reduction in the dispersion for 2000 when 
contrasted to 1999, the date when the Central Bank started to publish the bank level lending 
rates. 
 
Another interesting finding is that loan categories like personal loans and overnight lending 
are still ranked amongst those with the highest levels of dispersion whereas vendor operations 
keep showing the smallest levels of dispersion. By contrast, the mean-adjusted measures of 
dispersion for personal overdraft show much smaller relative figures than the previous ones. 
 
A better account of the rate dispersion behavior across loan categories can be gauged by the 
observation of box plot type graphs. Box plot graphs show a shaded area divided in two 
regions by the median observation. The upper and the lower limits of the shaded area 
correspond to the third and first quartiles respectively. The shaded area shows therefore the 
50% central observations. The finer limits of the graphs show the maximum and the minimum 
rates observed in each month when there are no aberrant observations.
3 Figures 5 to 13 show 
the box plot graphs for each loan category. All the plots are centered around the median value.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Aberrant observations are all observations that distance more than 1.5 times the interquartile distance from the 
first and the third quartiles. When aberrant observations are detected the finer limits show the maximum and the 
minimum rates once such observations are eliminated.   9
Figure 5: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates - Overnight Lending 
























































Figure 6: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Receivables Discount 
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Figure 7: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Discount of Promissory Notes 

























































Figure 8: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Working Capital 
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Figure 9: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Overdraft Line of Credit 


























































Figure 10: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Financing for Acquisition of Goods 
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Figure 11: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Vendor 





















































Figure 12: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Personal Overdraft 
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Figure 13: Box Plot of Centered Monthly Rates – Personal Loans 





























































From the analysis of Figures 5 to 13 one can make the following comments: 
-  For overdraft line of credit and for personal loans one observes several rates well 
above the average values in a systematic way. This pattern is not observed for 
overnight lending, receivables discount, working capital, finance for goods 
acquisition, and vendor, for which the occurrence of high rates is less frequent and, 
when they happen they turn out to be either concentrated in some few months or 
distributed in no systematic way. Both overdraft line of credit and personal loans 
are typically very diluted markets with a large number of small borrowers. 
-  For receivables discount and for personal overdraft one finds a large number of 
rates both above and below the average values. For the first loan category, the 
borrowers have heterogeneous risk characteristics, which reflect the quality of both 
the borrower himself and the receivables issuer. For personal overdraft, the 
existence of very small rates is an indication of the financial institution policy to 
offer loan lines to highly regarded customers with low risks. For the upper rates, 
switching costs can explain the extraction of informational rents by banks on these 
customers. 
-  For overnight lending, overdraft line of credit, goods acquisition, and vendor, one 
notices that the dispersion for the rates above the median was larger than the 
dispersion for the rates below it. The opposite happens for personal overdraft and 
for personal loans. Finally, receivables discount, discount of promissory notes, and 
working capital show a more symmetric pattern of rate dispersion. Thus, some 
loan categories display asymmetries with greater dispersion in one direction 
(above or below the median). Quantile regression techniques will be used in the 
next section to try to account for such patterns.  
   14
Another interesting issue is the dispersion persistence. In other terms, one wishes to 
investigate whether the same banks systematically occupy the distribution extremities or, 
alternatively, whether there is high mobility across the dispersion distribution. High 
persistence can be an indication of some bank heterogeneity that makes a particular 
configuration of lending rate distribution to be reproduced over long intervals of time. 
 
We evaluate the degree of dispersion persistence through transition matrices for each quartile. 
Our goal is to verify how banks that are in a certain quartile during month t will be distributed 
across the quartiles in month t+s. Table 3 reports the results. The results are only shown for 
all the loan categories due to the small number of observations for some of them. The 
transition matrices are calculated taking July 2002 as the final period and different starting 
periods. The largest window takes the whole sample period from March 1997 to July 2002. 
 
Table 3: Transition Matrices 
   Period  2:  Jul/02   
 Quartiles  1  2  3  4   
1 74%  19%  4%  3%  100%  Period 1: 
2 19%  50%  27%  4%  100% 
3 5%  24%  56%  15%  100% 
Jun/01 
4 2%  5%  17%  76%  100% 
 
   Period  2:  Jul/02   
 Quartiles  1  2  3  4   
1 66%  26%  4%  5%  100%  Period 1: 
2 21%  44%  29%  6%  100% 
3 7%  25%  48%  19%  100% 
Jun/00 
4 4%  6%  23%  67%  100% 
 
   Period  2:  Jul/02   
 Quartiles  1  2  3  4   
1 51%  26%  14%  9%  100%  Period 1: 
2 23%  37%  34%  7%  100% 
3  18% 31% 33% 18%  100% 
Jun/99 
4 7%  13%  34%  47%  100% 
 
   Periodo  2:  Jul/02   
 Quartiles  1  2  3  4   
1 41%  39%  8%  12%  100%  Period 1: 
2  28% 34% 26% 12%  100% 
3  11% 30% 47% 11%  100% 
Jun/98 
4 4%  19%  29%  47%  100% 
 
   Period  2:  Jul/02   
 Quartiles  1  2  3  4   
1 44%  29%  18%  9%  100%  Period 1: 
2  16% 37% 32% 16%  100% 
3  17% 29% 32% 22%  100% 
Mar/97 
4 4%  19%  40%  37%  100% 
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The degree of persistence can be evaluated by observing the values along the main diagonal. 
The persistence is very high for the extreme quartiles. Thus, 76% of the banks that were in the 
top quartile by June 2001 remained in this position in July 2002. Similarly, 74% of the banks 
located in the bottom quartile by June 2001 remained there 13 months later. 
 
The degree of persistence reduces when the time between the initial and the final periods of 
comparison increase. For the largest window considered in the analysis, 37% of the banks in 
the top quartile in March 1997 remained in this quartile 65 months later. For the banks in the 
bottom quartile, the proportion is 44%. 
 
 
3)  Search costs and interest rate dispersion 
 
Many different factors can account for the observed pattern of loan interest rate dispersion 
described in the previous section. The aim of this section is to access the role played by search 
costs in explaining some of these trends. 
 
We use a dummy variable representing the period after which the Central Bank started to 
make available bank level lending rates at its homepage as our proxy for search costs. Our 
identifying assumption is that this event characterizes as a natural experiment. This measure 
was implemented to “stimulate competition among financial institutions and to promote 
greater transparency in bank operations”
4 as part of a Central Bank sponsored project with the 
declared aim to reduce the bank interest spread. Thus, the Central Bank had no intention to 
interfere in the loan interest rate dispersion with this measure. We therefore take it as an 
exogenous event as far as the interest rate dispersion is concerned. 
 
Since our results in the previous section show that the dispersion is correlated with the mean 
level of the lending rates, the dispersion measure we consider in this section are adjusted to 
take into account this effect. 
 
We present two kinds of results. In the first one, monthly dispersion measures are first 
obtained and then regressed on our measure of search costs. In the second, quantile 
regressions are performed for the bank-level lending rates. 
 
3a. Two-step regressions 
 
Apart from search costs, many other factors can explain the behavior of the loan rate 
dispersion. We use a two-step approach to parsimoniously control for the effect of these other 
factors. 
 
In the first step, the bank-level lending rates for all loan categories are pooled and regressed 
on a set of bank dummies and time dummies for each month. There are 37,590 observations 
for an unbalanced panel data set with 225 commercial banks and 65 months. The residual 
from this first step is a measure of the bank lending rate for a given loan category free of the 
effects of both time-invariant bank characteristics and of macroeconomic factors.
5 
 
                                                 
4 Banco Central do Brasil (2000), p. 35. 
5 Nakane and Koyama (2002) show that the lending rate dispersion differs for retail and wholesale banks. 
Another bank characteristic to affect the dispersion is whether the bank is a customary or an occasional player in 
a certain loan category market.   16
Monthly dispersion measures adjusted for the median value are then formed for each loan 
category from the residuals from the first-step regression. The interquartile distance is our 
measure of dispersion. This variable is the dependent variable in the second step. The set of 
regressors in the second step include dummies for each loan category and interaction terms 
between the loan category dummies and a dummy taking one for the months after October 
1999. The sign of this last coefficient is of our primary interest. A negative sign is to be 
interpreted as an indication of the relevance of search costs. 
 
Table 4 reports the results. Two sets of results are shown. The first ones have no interaction 
terms. Thus, the impact of search costs is assumed to be the same across all the loan 
categories. The second regression includes the interaction terms allowing for different 
responses according to each loan category.
6 
 
Table 4: Regressions for the interquartile distance 
No Interactions  With Interactions   
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error
      
Constant  1.6040 0.0399 1.6229 0.0647 
      
Dummy Receivables Discount  -0.3139 0.0514 -0.5841 0.0766 
Dummy Discount of Promissory Notes -0.0634 0.0616 -0.1365 0.1073 
Dummy Working Capital   -0.2901 0.0420 -0.4362 0.0726 
Dummy Overdraft Line of Credit  0.4908 0.0518 0.6415 0.0872 
Dummy Goods Acquisition - Corp  -0.2590 0.0439 -0.3186 0.0755 
Dummy Vendor  -0.2940 0.0444 -0.4305 0.0778 
Dummy Personal Overdraft  1.3814 0.0816 1.6207 0.1368 
Dummy Personal Loans  0.7019 0.0556 0.8269 0.0980 
      
Dummy October 99  -0.4182 0.0285     
      
Oct 99 X Overnight Lending     -0.4556  0.0701 
Oct 99 X Receivables Discount     0.0765  0.0450 
Oct 99 X Discount of Promis. Notes     -0.3115  0.1026 
Oct 99 X Working Capital     -0.1678  0.0366 
Oct 99 X Overdraft Line of Credit     -0.7525  0.0660 
Oct 99 X Goods Acquisition – Corp     -0.3380  0.0539 
Oct 99 X Vendor     -0.1867  0.0487 
Oct 99 X Personal Overdraft     -0.9268  0.1357 
Oct 99 X Personal Loans     -0.7018  0.0809 
    
Number of Observations  585 585 
R Squared
  0.7540 0.8034 
 
When no interaction terms are included, the dummy variable for observations after October 
99 captures the average effect impact of all loan categories. The coefficient is negative and 
highly significant. The point estimate indicates that the monthly loan rate dispersion saw a 
                                                 
6 Overnight lending is the excluded base group. Reported standard errors are White heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors.   17
reduction of 0.418 percentage points (41.8 basis point) after the availability of the rates at the 
Central Bank’s homepage. 
 
The results with the inclusion of the interaction terms show that the impact of search costs is 
not homogeneous across the loan categories. The only loan category for which the interaction 
term does not have the expected negative sign is for receivables discount. The positive 
coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant though. For all the other loan 
categories, the interaction term is negative and highly significant. For personal overdraft and 
for overdraft line of credit, the reduction in the mean dispersion after October 1999 reached 
92.7 and 75.3 basis point, respectively. 
 
The results therefore provide strong support for the relevance of search costs in affecting the 
dispersion of lending rates in Brazil. It is important to emphasize that such impact is measured 
after accounting for any bank-level fixed effects, macroeconomic factors, and the behavior of 
the average lending rate. 
 
3b. Quantile regressions 
 
The second-step regression in the previous section does not make full use of all the 
information available in the sample because it just pays attention to the interquartile distance. 
A more accurate view is provided by regressions of the loan interest rate against the proxy for 
search costs for each quantile of the distribution.
7 This section presents the results of this 
exercise. 
 
The quantile regressions were run for each loan category. The dependent variable is the 
residual from the first-step regression from the previous section. In other terms, the dependent 
variable is the loan interest rate once the bank-level fixed effects and the macroeconomic 
factors captured by time dummies are netted out. Apart from a constant term, the only 
regressor included is the dummy variable for the observations after October 1999. An 
indication of a reduction in the loan rate dispersion due to a reduction in search costs would 
be captured by monotonically decreasing coefficients for the dummy variables as one goes 
from the bottom (.10) to the top (.90) quantile. Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients for 
the dummy variable (standard errors are reported in parentheses). 
 
Table 5: Quantile regressions: coefficient of the October 99 dummy 



































































































































                                                 


































































































Overall, the results confirm the findings of the previous section, which concentrated in the 
75
th-25
th spread. Apart from receivables discount, the evidence favoring the idea that 
reduction in search costs helped to reduce the loan rate dispersion is rather strong. 
 
For some loan categories such as overnight lending, and overdraft line of credit the coefficient 
on the dummy variable decreases monotonically across all the quantiles. Moreover, banks 
charging lower lending rates have actually increased their rates after October 1999 whereas 
those charging higher lending rates have decreased their rates after that date. Thus, the 
reduction in the loan rate dispersion for these loan categories reflect a convergence movement 
for all the banks across the quantiles. 
 
For vendor and for personal loans there is a monotonically decreasing pattern for the dummy 
variable coefficient apart from the top (.90) quantile. That is, reduction in the dispersion after 
October 1999 is found for all the banks excepting those charging the highest lending rates. 
But, even for these banks, one would observe reduction in the dispersion when contrasted to 
the banks in the bottom quantile, i.e. if one takes the 90
th-10
th dispersion measure. 
 
For discount of promissory notes, working capital, finance for goods acquisition, and for 
personal overdraft the monotonic pattern is observed for the top quantiles but not for the 
bottom quantiles. So, for these loan categories banks charging the lowest lending rates do not 
conform to the expected pattern. However, for all these loan categories one can see that the 
90
th-10
th dispersion reduces after October 1999. 
 
Another interesting finding is that only for working capital one notices negative signs for the 
dummy variable coefficient across all the quantiles. That is, only for this loan category it is 
true that banks across the rate distribution have reduced their lending rates after October 1999. 
The general pattern for the other loan categories is for banks in the bottom side of the 
distribution to have increased their lending rates while banks in the upper side of the 





This paper showed some evidence related to the inter-bank dispersion of lending rates for 
different loan categories in Brazil. 
 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: a) the dispersion is very high 
in numerical terms; b) there is great heterogeneity in the dispersion behavior across loan 
categories; c) there is great time variation in the dispersion measures; d) dispersion keeps   19
being significant even after controlling for the behavior of the mean levels of the lending 
rates; e) dispersion shows high persistence, specially in the extreme quartiles; f) reduction in 






BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL (2000): Juros e Spread Bancário no Brasil – Avaliação de 
1 ano do projeto. Departamento de Estudos e Pesquisas. (available online at 
www.bcb.gov.br) 
 
DAHLBY, Bev, & WEST, Douglas S. (1986); “Price dispersion in an automobile insurance 
market”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 418-438. 
 
KESSNER, Ekkehard & POLBORN, Mattias K. (2000): “A new test of price dispersion”, 
German Economic Review, 1, 221-237. 
 
KOENKER, Roger & BASSETT, Jr., Gilbert (1978): “Regression quantiles”, Econometrica, 
46, 33-50. 
 
NAKANE, Márcio I., & KOYAMA, Sérgio Mikio (2002): “Dispersão das taxas de 
empréstimos bancários no Brasil” in BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, Economia 
Bancária e Crédito – Avaliação de 3 anos do projeto Juros e Spread bancário, 
Chapter 6, 80-100. (available online at www.bcb.gov.br) 
 
ROBERTS, Mark J., & SUPINA, Dylan (1997): “Output price and markup dispersion in 
microdata: the roles of producer heterogeneity and noise”, NBER Working Paper 
6075. 
 
SALOP, Steven C., & STIGLITZ, Joseph E. (1982): “The theory of sales: a simple model of 
equilibrium price dispersion with identical agents”, American Economic Review, 72, 
1121-1130. 
 
SORENSEN, Alan T. (2000): “Equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription 
drugs”, Journal of Political Economy, 108, 833-850. 
 
STIGLER, George J. (1961): “The economics of information”, Journal of Political Economy, 
69, 213-225. 